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THE CASE AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
CHARLES DENBY, JR.*
The purpose of this article is to set forth briefly and as simply as possible the
reasons for believing that at least the major provisions of the Social Security Act are
unconstitutional. As a background for the discussion, a brief review of the history
of the legislation is necessary.
Prior to the depression of 192, there was in this country no movement of any
importance for social insurance. Workmen's compensation laws and factory laws
regulating the hours of employment of women and children and the installation of
safety devices were familiar, but compulsory unemployment insurance had hardly
been heard of and, although there were a few private pension plans in existence, state-
wide old-age pensions had just begun to be mentioned. But the war had left us
with a highly developed industrial system and the problem of old-age dependency
and the problems created by the shortening of the useful life of the industrial worker
had already become felt as a consequence. The short depression of 1921 drew atten-
tion to these problems and to the related one of unemployment. Various states
began to experiment with old-age assistance laws and there was even a feeble move-
ment in favor of compulsory unemployment "insurance."1  The attention of the
public was, however, not drawn to these problems until after the current depression
was well under way.
By 1932, twenty-one states had adopted old-age assistance laws. They were a
modified form of poor relief legislation, giving benefits based upon need. All of
these laws followed the same general pattern: they provided for grants to aged in-
digent persons, the amount of the allowance being determined in each case by the
need of the individual beneficiary, but being limited in nearly all cases to $3o.oo per
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'The term "unemployment insurance" is popularly, though inaccurately, used to include both "reserve"
plans, in which employers are compelled to maintain reserves available to their employees only and
"pooled fund" plans, which partake of the nature of insurance, in which contributions are made into a
central pool or fund, available for payment of benefits to all employees covered by the plan. Hence the
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month. Experience with these laws was successful in many states; and although
there was the inevitable opposition from die-hard employing interests, these laws
were becoming recognized as a desirable form of social legislation consistent with
American principles.2
During the first two years of the depression, agitation for so-called unemployment
insurance also gained momentum. Wisconsin adopted an American version of the
continental system of unemployment insurance and in 193I enacted the first unem-
ployment reserve law to be adopted in this country.3 The matter was studied by
legislative committees in a number of other states and by most of them the principle
of unemployment insurance was approved and the enactment of legislation of this
character recommended. 4  There are, however, grave doubts as to the efficacy of
so-called unemployment insurance, and much respectable opinion that it is a falla-
cious remedy, the adoption of which will do more harm than good.5 Under the
circumstances, many felt that a system so novel and untried in America should not
be hastily adopted, and should first be subjected to practical test in a few states before
being adopted everywhere.
With the advent of the New Deal, however, the principle of experimentation
within state boundaries and the gradual development of a national policy was super-
seded by that of impetuous action on a grand scale. Accordingly, the Social Security
Act,6 called one of the cornerstones of the new order, contemplates the setting up,
practically at one stroke, of a social insurance program on a national scale.
I
In addition to providing comparatively unimportant grants to the states to assist
them in financing tl~eir own plans for aid to the blind, to dependent children and
for maternal and child welfare, and in addition to making appropriations for federal
public health work, the Social Security Act contains three major features: (i) Title
I, makiig grants to states having old-age assistance laws which comply with certain
specifications; (2) Tides II and VIII, setting up a full-fledged old-age pension system,
federally financed and federally administered; and (3) Title IX, imposing payroll
taxes designed to force the adoption by all of the states of unemployment compensa-
tion laws meeting standards specified in the Act.
Tide I appropriates sums sufficient to match sums expended by the states pursuant
to approved old-age assistance plans, provided that the federal liability shall not be in
excess of $15.00 per month per beneficiary. To entitle a state to the financial as-
'See the writer's article, Do We Need Old Age Pensions? Yes (1933) 17o ANNALS 93.
'Wis. Laws 193r (Spec. Sess.) c. 2o. The act went into effect July 1, 1934.
'Particularly helpful reports favoring an unemployment reserve system were prepared by the Mas-
sachusetts, Minnesota and New York Commissions. The Ohio Commission favored a pooled fund. The
Pennsylvania Commission, of which the writer was Chairman, was divided; half the members opposing
compulsory unemployment compensation in any form.
'See the writer's testimony in opposition to the Wagner-Lewis Bill. Hearings before a Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 7659, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) at pp. 359.388.
6 Act of Aug. 14, X935, 49 STAT. 620.
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sistance provided in Title I, the. state plan must be compulsory in all political sub-
divisions of the state, must provide for financial participation by the state and either
state administration or state supervision, by methods of administration satisfactory
to the Social Security Board; must provide for a hearing to applicants denied assist-
ance; must provide for making periodic reports to the Social Security Board and
must provide that if, upon the death of any recipient of old-age assistance, the state
shall collect anything from his estate, one-half of the amount so collected shall be
paid to the United States. Furthermore, in order to be approved, the state law may
not impose as a condition for eligibility for assistance an age requirement of more
than 65 years, a residence requirement which excludes a person who has resided in
the state for five out of nine years preceding his application and for one year im-
mediately preceding the application, or a citizenship requirement which excludes a
citizen of the United States.
Title II establishes a complete system of old-age pensions, applicable broadly to
all employees in the United States, including salaried corporate officers, except those
engaged in agricultural labor, domestic service, government employment and em-
ployment by charitable organizations.' The system is wholly under federal adminis-
tration, and the Federal Act stipulates the benefits, the. method of their payment and
all other matters relating to the administration of the law. Title VIII provides the
funds for building up the reserve from which the benefits are to be paid. These
funds are provided by employers and their employees in equal proportions, by im-
posing on the latter an "income tax" and, on the former, an "excise tax," fixed in both
cases by a percentage of payroll.
It will be seen that the foregoing provisions furnish a complete system of relief
for old-age'dependency. Although Title II provides what is in effect a compulsory
saving plan with respect to a group which comprises nearly two-thirds of all gainfully
employed persons in the United States,7 Title I is a necessary complement thereto,
for two reasons: first, to care for needy aged persons who fall within the groups
excluded from the federal pension plan; second, to care for those who are already
advanced in years, and will therefore not be able to build up an adequate pension to
secure them from dependency when they reach 65.
Title IX is of a different character. The principal hurdle to the enactment of state
unemployment compensation laws was felt to be that of interstate competition: the
argument being that a state enacting such a law was imposing upon its employers a
burden which would place them at a competitive disadvantage with those of states
which did not adopt such laws. The same argument had been urged against work-
men's compensation laws and child labor laws. Title IX is designed to do away with
this argument. It imposes an "excise tax" upon those who employ eight or more
persons in employments other than approximately the same as are exempted from
'Data prepared under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury at the request of Senator Jesse
H. Metcalf, and submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance, indicate that approximately 25,200,000
gainfully employed persons will be subject to the tax under Title VIII in the year 1937.
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the provisions of Tides II and VIII. Against this tax, however, is allowed a credit
equivalent to the maximum payments such employers must make pursuant to ap-
proved state unemployment':ompensation laws, even though less than the applicable
maximum may have become due because of favorable unemployment experience.
But the total credit may not exceed 90 per cent of the federal tax. In order to be
approved, a state law must comply with specifications set forth in the Act. Among
these is a requirement that all monies paid into the state fund shall be paid over to
the United States Treasury for investment and administration. The net effect of
this section is that while employers in states which have adopted no unemployment
insurance laws must pay the full tax to the Treasury, their employees can receive no
benefits whatever; and that employers who have been compelled to make payments
pursuant to a state unemployment law which does not meet federal specifications
will have to pay the federal payroll tax nevertheless. That a tax of this sort will be
most effective in inducing the desired state action can hardly be doubted.
We have, therefore, for consideration a law-or a group of laws combined into
one-which (i) grants financial assistance to states in carrying out their poor relief
laws, providedthat these laws meet a pattern prescribed by Congress; (2) sets up a
nation-wide compulsory pension system, applicable to all industrial eniployment; and
(3) imposes taxes so designed as to exert strong pressure upon state legislatures to
adopt unemployment compensation laws.
II
In approaching the consideration of the constitutionality of any federal law, the
essential consideration is that the federal government is a government of delegated
powers. To make certain that these powers should not be exceeded, the Tenth
Amendment expressly provides that
"All powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
Accordingly, the federal government has only such powers as are expressly con-
ferred upon it by the Constitution and such as are reasonably implied from those
granted." Thus, the express power to regulate interstate commerce has been held to
carry with it, not only the power to regulate matters clearly interstate in character,
but also the implied power to regulate matters otherwise of only local concern, if they
directly affect interstate commerce.9 So, the power to borrow money, to lay and
'McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 36, 407 (U. S. x819); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, s Wheat. 304,
326 (U. S. 1816).
9 Such matters are the regulation of intrastate railway rates to the extent that they affect interstate rates:
Houston E. & W. T. R. Co. v. U. S., 234 U. S. 342 (1913); Railroad Comm. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.,
257 U. S. 563 (r921); regulation of local conspiracy to obtain a corner on the interstate cotton *market:
U S. v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525 (1913); regulation of local trading in futures in interstate grain market:
Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1922). So also, temporary or transitory local transactions are
subject to federal regulation where they are integral parts of a broader interstate transaction, as distribution
of films from interstate commerce by local distributors: Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 291
(1923); sale of cattle shipped in from without the state, from local stockyards:, Swift & Co. v. U. S., 196
U. S. 375, (1905); regulation of local dealers in such cattle; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U, S. 495 (1922).
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collect taxes and to pay the public debt, involves, as a necessary and proper incident,
the power to establish a national bank.' 0 This, in turn, carries with it the power to
authorize such banks to engage in the normal functions of a bank-most of which
are, in themselves, local in character;" and even to confer trust powers upon national
banks, in order that they shall not be at a disadvantage in competing with state-
chartered competitors.' 2 By a logical extension of the same principle, Congress was
held to have been within its powers in the enactment of the Federal Farm Loan
Act, the principal purpose of which was to permit the loaning of money upon farm
lands on favorable terms, on the ground that the Federal Land Banks created under
the authority of that Act were designated depositaries of public money and financial
agents of the government.' 3
So long as the federal government is acting within its proper sphere, however,
it is supreme. Its activities cannot be limited or interfered with by the states.
Accordingly,
"When Congress acts within the limits of its Constitutional authority, it is not the
province of the judicial branch of the government to question its motives."' 4
Conversely, however, the power of the states to regulate their purely internal
affairs has never been surrendered to the federal government and cannot be interfered
with by the latter. The maintenance of this balance is essential to the preservation
of our dual system of government and is one of the safeguards of traditional Amer-
ican liberty.
The conflict between the foregoing principles has been one of the chief concerns
of constitutional interpretation. If the only limitations upon the gradual extension
of federal power were those of logic alone, there would soon be such an encroachment
upon the reserved powers of the states that the latter would be entirely whittled away;
and we would awake to find ourselves to all intents and purposes wholly under a
central government and impotent in local affairs. That this danger was foreseen by
the framers of the Constitution, and that they deliberately sought to guard against it,
is nowhere stated more forcefully than in the following passage from an opinion of
the Supreme Court in a case in which it rejected the contention that there are legis-
lative powers affecting the nation as a whole which belong to, although they are not
expressed in, the grant of powers. In reiterating that the federal government is one
of enumerated powers, and that this proposition, although clear from the Constitution
itself, was reasserted by the Tenth Amendment, the Court said that
"This amendment, which was seemingly adopted with prescience of just such conten-
tiQn as the present, disclosed the widespread fear that the National Government might,
under the pressure of a supposed general welfare, attempt to exercise powers which had
" Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738 (U. S. 1824).
"'McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 36 (U. S. 18ig).
'First Nat. Bank v. Fellows, 244 U. S. 416 (1917).
'Smith v. Kansas City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U. S. 18o (1921).
" Id. at 2lO.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
not been granted. With equal determination the framers intended that no such assump-
tion should ever find justification in the organic act, and that if in the future further
powers seemed necessary they should be granted by the people in the manner they had
provided for amending that act."'15
The possibilities of such an extension of the federal authority were never more
graphically indicated than by the principal New Deal laws, all of which were sought
to be sustained as logical extensions of granted federal powers; and which, had they
been sustained, would shortly have reduced the states to mere administrative districts
in a central government.
The principal argument to sustain these laws was the plea that the national
emergency and changed economic conditions justified a wide extension of federal
power. But the limits of constitutional authority apply under all circumstances and
conditions. If an act is uncoristitutional, neither an emergency nor a widely-felt
economic necessity can justify it.'" That action by Congress is economically or other-
wise highly desirable is immaterial in a consideration of federal power. Thus, in
holding invalid the Railroad Retirement Act, an act having purposes similar to those
of Title II of the Social Security Act, the Supreme Court said that
"though we should think the measure embodies a valuable social plan and be in entire
sympathy with its purpose and intended results, if the provisions go beyond the boundaries
of constitutional power we must so declare."' 7
Similarly, in holding invalid a tax, the purpose of which was to prevent the em-
ployment of child labor in manufacturing and mining industries, the Court said that
it could not avoid this duty,
"even though it require us to refuse to give effect to legislation designed to promote the
highest good."'s
In. invalidating the N. R. A. Codes by unanimous action, the Court held that
neither the existence of a "national crisis" demanding "a broad and intensive co6p-
erative effort by those engaged in trade and industry," nor the existence of a "serious
economic situation" could justify federal action beyond the scope of its delegated
powers.' 9
Even if it be conceded, therefore, that a national system of social insurance is
highly desirable; the unemployment and old-age dependency are national problems
which cannot be solved by merely local action; that the problems of investment of
reserves make separate state systems impractical; and that for other cogent and im-
perative reasons the Social Security Act is clearly necessary and desirable, these
. Kansas v. Colorado, 2o6 U. S. 46, 90 (xgo7).
16Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S., 295 U. S. 495, 529, 549 (935).
"'Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 346 (1935).
'Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 37 (922).
'Supra note z5.
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reasons do not justify the Act.20 Although an Act of Congress enjoys every pre-
sumption of constitutionality,21 nothing less than clear constitutional authority can
sustain this or any other Act of Congress.
In order to sustain the various provisions of the Social Security Act, it is there-
fore necessary to find an express or implied grant of federal power of which each of
these provisions is an exercise.
The only powers which might possibly come in question are the power to regulate
commerce among the several states, the power to lay and collect taxes and excises, or
the related power to use funds raised through taxation to provide for the general
welfare of the United States.
It will, therefore, be necessary to examine the commerce, taxing and general wel-
fare powers to determine whether directly or by implication they sustain the Act.
III
None of the provisions of the Social Security Act can be justified as an exercise
of the commerce power. It is true that this power is one of the widest at the dis-
posal of the federal government. As has been pointed out, it permits Congress to
regulate not only interstate commerce as such, but also matters normally of merely
local concern, where they have a direct effect upon interstate commerce. But when
Congress sought to make what appeared to be a logical extension of the commerce
power by passing a law prohibiting the transportation in interstate commerce of
articles manufactured by child labor, the law was declared unconstitutional. The
Court held that manufacturing and mining are not commerce and could not be
directly regulated by Congress; that otherwise harmless articles of commerce do not
become harmful merely because manufactured by. child labor, and that Congress'
power to exclude injurious articles from interstate commerce does not justify the
exclusion of such goods. The essence of the decision is the holding that if the act
in question could be upheld,
"all manufacture intended for interstate shipment would be brought under federal control
to the practical exclusion of the authority of the States, a result certainly not contemplated
by the framers of the Constitution .... ,22
The logic of the decision has rightly been questioned; 23 but its ultimate sound-
ness seems clear. To have sustained the law in question would have led inevitably
'The Act establishes a long-term program and cannot be characterized as emergency legislation, but,
even if this were attempted, its constitutional position would not be strengthened. Home Building &
Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (934); Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866). In the former
case the Court said (at p. 425): "Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted
power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved. The Constitution
was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of pow& t6 the Federal Government and its
limitations of the power of the States were determined in the light of emergency and they are not altered
by emergency. What power was thus granted and what limitations were thus imposed are questions which
have always been, and always will be, the subject of close examination under our constitutional system."
'So also will it be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid the conclusion that it is unconstitutional,
U. S. v. Jin FuCy Moy, 241 U. S. 394 (1916), and every reasonable construction will be resorted to to that
end. Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648 (1895).
' Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 272 (1917).
'See CoRwiN, ThE Twzuonr os THE Sus '.a CoutT (1934) 26 et seq.
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to virtually complete surrender of state authority in matters of domestic concern; for,
granted the validity of this law, there could be no logical limit to the extent of this
indirect control over local affairs.
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the law should be sustained as an
aid to the more liberal states in maintaining their labor standards; as a protection, in
other words, from interstate competition. Of this argument, the Court said,
"In other words [the Government argues] that the unfair competition, thus engendered,
may be controlled by closing the channels of interstate commerce to manufacturers in those
States where the local laws do not meet what Congress deems to be the more just standard
of other States.
"There is no power vested in Congress to require the States to exercise their police
powe so as to prevent possible unfair competition. Many causes may co~perate to give
one State, by reason of local laws or conditions, an economic advantage over others. The
Commerce Clause was not intended to give to Congress a general authority to equalize
such conditions."2 4
The decision in this case was reached by a narrowly divided court, and the
extent of its authority was for some years in doubt. But since the recent decision
unanimously holding the N. I. R. A. to be unconstitutional, there can no longer be
any doubt that a merely limited effect upon interstate commerce cannot justify the
federal regulation of local concerns. In that case, it was unanimously held that the
indirect effect of hours and wages in local employment upon interstate commerce was
too remote to justify federal regulation of hours and wages in local enterprise. As
was stated in the opinion of the Chief Justice,
"Interstate commerce is brought in only upon the charge that violations of [thd pro-
visions of the live poultry code]-as to hours and wages of employees and local sales--
'affected' interstate commerce.
".... But where the effect of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce is merely
indirect, such transactions remain within the domain of state power. If the commerce clause
were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions which could be said to have an
indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically
all the activities of the .people and the authority of the State over its domestic concerns
would exist only by sufferance of the federal government....
"The question of chief importance relates to the provisions of the Code as to the hours
and wages of those employed in defendants' slaughterhouse markets. It is plain that
these requirements are imposed in order to govern the details of defendants' management
of their local business. The persons employed in slaughtering and selling in local trade
are not employed in interstate commerce. Their hours and wages have no direct relation
to interstate commerce."325
So also did the Court reject again the interstate competition argument:
"The Government also makes the point that efforts to enact state legislation establish-
ing high labor standards have been impeded by the belief that unless similar action is taken
generally, commerce will be diverted from the States adopting such standards, and that
" Hammer v. Dagenhart, supra note 22, at 273.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S., 295 U. S. 495, 546, 548 (1935).
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this fear of diversion has led to demands for federal legislation on the subject of wages
and hours. The apparent implication is that the federal authority under the commerce
clause should be deemed to extend to the establishment of rules to govern wages and hours
in intrastate trade and industry generally throughout the country, thus overriding the
authority of the States to deal with domestic problems arising from labor conditions in
their internal commerce.
"It is not the province of the Court to consider the economic advantages or disadvantages
of such a centralized system. It is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution does not
provide for it."2 6
It is, therefore, hopeless to try to sustain the Social Security Act as an exercise of
the commerce power.
IV
The taxing power of the United States is almost unlimited, except for specific
limitations not here material, so long as the imposition is in fact a tax. If, however,
the "tax" is a tax in form only, and really is a regulation, under the guise of a tax, of
matters which the federal government has no power to regulate directly, thet the
tax will be held to be invalid.
Here again is the problem of limiting the logical extension of an admitted power,
in order to preserve the authority of the states and our dual system.
How far the Court would go in declaring invalid an act which on its face imposes
a tax, but which at the same time has the effect of regulating a matter beyond the
scope of federal regulation, was for many years not clear. In early cases, the Court
had sustained a prohibitory tax upon the circulating notes of persons and of state
banks, though the act seemed clearly intended to prevent the circulation of such
notes in competition with national bank notes.27 Later, the Court sustained a pro-
hibitory tax on oleomargarine, holding that it was within the discretion of Congress
of levy excise taxes although the effect of such tax might incidentally be oppressive
or even destructive.2 8 Finally, the Court sustained the Harrison Narcotic Drug Act,
which imposed a special tax on the manufacture, importation, sale or gift of nar-
cotics, but the real purpose of which was obviously to regulate dealings in narcotics
and to confine them to registered dealers and physicians. 29
The principle of the foregoing cases, logically extended, would permit almost
unlimited indirect regulation through the imposition of burdensome taxes. In the
Child Labor Tax Case,30 however, the Court put a limit to this process of extension.
After it had been held that the commerce power did not permit Congress directly to
prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce of goods manufactured by child
labor, Congress endeavored to accomplish the same end by an ostensible resort to the
taxing power. It imposed an "excise tax" of io per cent of all net profits of mines,
quarries, mills and other manufacturing establishments which employed children
'Id. at 549.
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869).
UMcCray v. U. S., 195 U. S. 27 (1904). 'U. S. v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (i9'g).
'Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 2o (1922).
324 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
under the ages or for more than the hours specified in the Act. Although the Act
was on its face a taxing statute, the Court held that it obviously was intended as a
regulation of child labor:
"Its prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose are palpable. All others can see
and understand this. How can we properly shut our minds to it?
". .. Grant the validity of this law, and all that Congress would need to do hereafter,
in seeking to take over to its control any one of the great number of subjects of publi;
interest, jurisdiction of whiph the states have never parted with, and which are reserved to
them by the Tenth Amendment, would be to enact a detailed measure of complete regula-
tion of the subject and enforce it by a so-called tax upon departures from it. To give such
magic to the word 'tax' would be to break down all constitutional limitation of the powers
of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the States." 31
The Court concluded that
"the so-called tax is a penalty to coerce people of a State to act as Congress wishes them to
act in respect of -a, matter completely the business of the state government under the
Federal Constitution."3 2
Similarly, the Court held that thd Future-Trading Act of I92i, imposing a pro-
hibitive tax upon all contracts of sale of grain for future delivery, except only those
made by farmers or farmers' cooperative associations and those made by members
of a Board of Trade which had been designated by the Secretary of Agriculture as a
"contract market," was not in fact a taxing act but an act designed to bring grain
markets under federal regulation. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held:
"'The act.is in essence and on its face a complete regulation of boards of trade, with a
penalty of o cents a bushel on all "futures" to coerce boards of trade and their members
into compliance. When this purpose is declared in the title to the bill, and is so clear from
the effect of the provisions of the bill itself, it leaves no ground upon which the provisions
we have been considering can be sustained as a valid exercise of the taxing power'."3
In determining whether a "taxing" act is in fact a revenue measure or is really
enacted for an ulterior motive, the Court will consider the true purpose of the act,
as reflected in its title8 4 and by a consideration of the circumstances leading to its
enactment; 35 the amount of the tax relative to the value of the thing taxed;8
whether the tax will tend to raise revenue; 8 the degree to which the tax is related
to a scheme of regulation; 8 whether the regulatory features of the act, such as those
requiring the keeping of records, etc., are consistent with the enforcement of a tax
as such or really serve an ulterior purpose having nothing to do with the revenue
features of the act;8 9 and whether the revenue raised by the act is designed for the
support of the government, rather than for some other purpose.40
"Id. at 37, 38. 'Id. at 39.
"Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U. S. 475, 480 (1926), quoting from Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 66 (1922).
Ibid.
'Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., supra note 3o, at 39; U. S. v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 36 (1936);
U. S. v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287, 294 (1935).
"Trusler y. Crooks, supra note 33. 'Ibid.; ti. S. v. Butler, supra note 35,
3ibid. 'Linder v. U. S., 268 U. S. 5 (1925).
"OU. S. v. Butler, supra note 35; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 58o (884).
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In the light of the foregoing, and of the history and purpose of the legislation, it
can hardly be seriously contended that the Social Security Act is a taxing statute.
By none of the standards just mentioned can either Tide VIII or Tide IX be held to
be a "tax." As was quite frankly stated by the Chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee in reporting the bill for passage, the Act establishes a comprehensive plan
of "social insurance" against " (i) unemployment; (2) old age, (3) lack of a bread-
winner in families with young children."41  Similarly, the purpose of Tide IX
could not be stated more clearly than in this passage from the Report of the Com-
mittee on Ways and Means:
"The failure of the States to enact unemployment insurance laws is due largely to the
fact that to do so would handicap their industries in competition with the industries of
other States. The States have been unwilling to place this extra financial burden upon
their industries. A uniform, Nation-wide tax upon industry, thus removing this principal
obstacle in the way of unemployment insurance, is necessary before the States can go
ahead. Such a tax should make it possible for the States to enact this socially desirable
legislation.
"This is one of the purposes of title IX of this bill."'42
Nor does either tide tend to provide revenue for the general government. Clearly
is,this so of Tide IX, since the credit features, embodied for the purpose above stated,
will deprive the government of go per cent of the revenue produced. As for the
income taxes and excise taxes imposed by Title VIII, they are not levies "for the
support of the government." Although their proceeds are paid into the general
funds of the Treasury, the relationship between Tides II and VIII makes it evident
that these taxes are intended as contributions into a reserve fund which is to be used
to pay pensions to specific individuals, with respect to whom such contributions were
made. It is a compulsory saving plan, applicable to all industrial workers. No part
of the reserve fund is used for governmental purposes except to a limited extent in
the administration of the Social Security Act itself.
Moreover, even if Tide VIII were an exercise of the taxing power, there is grave
doubt whether the "excise tax" imposed upon the employers of the beneficiary em-
ployees is a valid charge, in view of the holding in the Railroad Retirement Act
decision that an analogous feature of that Act was a violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution, which prohibits the taking of property without due process
of law. The Court held that the Act was unconstitutional on that ,ground, since the
property of certain carriers would be taken to build up a fund used largely for the
benefit of the employees of other carriers. The Court held that
"There is no warrant for taking the property or money of one and transferring it to
anot&er without compensation, whether the object of the transfer be to build up the
equipment of the transferee or to pension its employees."'43
41 79 CONG. REc. 5468 (1935).
"H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74 th Cong., Ist Sess. (935) p. 8.
'Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 357 (935). The Railroad Retirement
Act, it is true, required a "contribution" for pension purposes from the employer railroads, but it is
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The argument applies with equal force to the compulsory taking of property from
employers to create a pension fund for their employees. And, as said by the Court
in the A. A. A. decision with respect to processing taxes levied upon processors, the
proceeds of which were to be paid to certain producers of agricultural products,
"A tax, in the general understanding of the term, and as used in the Constitution, sig-
nifies an exaction for the support of tl* Government. The word has never been thought
to connote the expropriation of money from one group for the benefit of another. We
may concede that the latter sort of imposition is constitutional when imposed to effectuate
regulation of a matter in which both groups are interested and in respect of which there
is a power of legislative regulation. But manifestly no justification for it can be found
unless as an integral part of such regulation.1 44
As for Title IX, its obvious and admitted purpose is to equalize competitive con-
ditions between states, insofar as a charge for unemploynment compensation is con-
cerned. That the imposition of a burden for such a purpose cannot be allowed,
appears from the cases above cited.45
It seems clear, therefore, that the Social Security Art cannot be sustained as a
taxing measure.
V
The remaining constitutional authority upon which the provisions of the Social
Security Act may be sought to be rested is the so-called "welfare clause." This
famous clause 40 provides that
"The Congress shall have power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States. .. .
From the beginning of the government, there has been protracted debate as to
the true meaning and scope of this clause; authorities being divided as to whether the
view of Madison or that of Hamilton, was correct 4 7 The former asserted that the
latter part of the clause conferred no independent power, but related to the specific
powers enumerated in the subsequent clauses of the same section; whereas Hamilton
maintained that the clause conferred a separate and distinct power to appropriate
revenues raised through taxation for the general welfare of the United States, and
not merely in order to carry out the powers elsewhere expressly enumerated. The
controversy appears finally to have been authoritatively resolved by the Supreme
Court in the A. A. A. decision, in which the Court interprets the welfare clause as
though it read
submitted that, from a constitutional standpoint, the fact that this levy was not designated as a tax is
inconsequential..
"U. S. v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 317 (1936).
"Supra notes 24, 26.
' U. S. CoNsr. ART. I, §8.
'For an able summary of the historical background, see Corwin, The Spending Power ol Congrest
(923) 36 HAuv. L. REv. 548.
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"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises;
in order to provide funds with which to pay the debts and to provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States."
and holds that the clause grants an independent substantive power. As said by the
Court,
"It results that the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public monies for
public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the
Constitution." 48
In other words, the power of Congress to appropriate monies for the general
welfare is a power of equal dignity and scope with the power to tax, the power to
regulate commerce or any other of the granted powers. The limits of this power are
not yet clear, however, and it has' been little tested in the courts. It is beyond
question, however, that the power is merely one to appropriate money in the interest
of the general welfare. It does not justify general legislation in the interest of the
general welfare. Such an interpretation was expressly rejected by the framers of the
Constitution,49 and cannot be justified upon any reasonable ground. Not merely
would such an interpretation do extreme violence to the context in which the clause
is set, but it would make all the other provisions of the Constitution superfluous, and
destrby the whole foundation of the dual system which it was the clear intention of
the Constitution-to establish.
Any lingering doubt on this question has been disposed of by the opinion of the
Court in the A. A. A. case. Expressly reserving the question whether an appro-
priation in aid of agriculture falls within the welfare clause, the Court holds that
no such appropriation is valid if it is in real effect a regulation of agriculture.
So long as there is no question of ulterior result or motive, the power is without
limit, except that the expenditure must be for the general welfar6 of the whole
country. Thus, it has been held to justify appropriations to construct a national
memorial park;5 ° and it seems clearly to justify appropriations which for years have
been made to aid public education in the states and to establish and maintain the
Bureau of Fisheries, the Bureau of Mines, the Department of Agriculture, and numer-
ous similar activities, as well as to relieve the unemployed and the sufferers from
drought, flood and other catastrophes. But the power conferred by the welfare
clause necessarily has limitations similar to those imposed upon the powers to tax
and to regulate commerce. Just as those powers may not be employed to serve an
ulterior end which cannot be reached by the direct action of Congress, just as they
cannot by "logical" extension be expanded into the sphere reserved to the states, so
the power to appropriate monies for the general welare of the United States cannot
be used to serve an ulterior end which could not be directly attained.
'U. S. v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 319 (1936).
"See STORY, CoMMENTARIEs oN THE CoNsmnTrron (x833) §908.
r'U. S. v. Gettysburg Ry. Co., 16o U. S. 668, 681 (1896).
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It would seem that this is the necessary consequence of the decision in the A. A. A.
case. In form, that case involved the validity of processing taxes. In substance, how-
ever, the decision rests on the fact that these taxes were imposed to provide the
revenue which in turn was to be used for the regulation of agriculture and the
creation of a scarcity of agricultural products in order to raise the price level. The
Supreme Court struck down the tax as part of this regulatory scheme. In itself,
however, the tax was valid. It was invalid only because of theuse to which the
proceeds of the tax were to be put. In other words, not only is a tax invalid which,
by imposing a penalty, directly results in regulation; but one is equally invilid which,
though otherwise valid; is designed to provide money which is to be spent to attain
an end which cannot be directly reached.
The A. A. A. decision went even further than this. It held that where Congress
cannot directly regulate conduct and cannot regulate it indirectly through the im-
position of a penalty, it cannot even appropriate public monies to purchase com-
pliance with rules and regulations, obedience to which it could not enforce. As said
by the Court,
"There is an obvious difference between a statute stating the conditions upon which
monies shall be expended and one effective only upon assumption of a contractual obliga-
tion to submit to a regulation which otherwise could not be enforced ...
"Congress has no power to enforce its commands on the farmer to the ends sought by
the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It must follow that it may not indirectly accomplish
those ends by taxing and spending to purchase compliance."51
Although strictly the A. A. A. case was decided as one involving the taxing power,
the case is really one which for the first time foreshadows the limitations which will
be placed upon the spending power. Though this is clear from the position of the
majority, it is made abundantly so in the dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice
Stone and concurred in by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo. Justice Stone's dissent
states at the outset that
"The present-levy is held invalid, not for any want of power in Congress to lay such
a tax to defray public expenditures, including those for the general welfare, but because
the use to which its proceeds are put it disapproved."' 2
He proceeds to state that though* the majority does not hold that the welfare clause
does not justify aid to farmers, it does disapprove of aid which is given as "a step in a
plan to regulate agricultural production." He concludes that such a limitation upon
the spendini power must virtually destroy it, and will certainly lead to "absurd con-
sequences":
"The government may give seeds to farmers, but may not condition the gift upon their
being planted in places where they are most needed or even planted at all. The govern-
ment may give money to the unemployed, but may not ask that those who get it shall give
labor in return, or even use it to support their families. It may give money to sufferers
'U. S. v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 36, 317 (1936).
'Id. at 325.
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from earthquake, fire, tornado, pestilence or flood, but may not impose conditions-health
precautions designed to prevent the spread of disease, or induce the movement of popula-
tion to safer or more sanitary areas. All that, because it is purchased regulation infringing
state powers, must be left for the states, who are unable or unwilling to supply the neces-
sary relief. The government may spend its money for vocational rehabilitation, 48 Stat.
389, but it may not, with the consent of all concerned, supervise the process which it
undertakes to aid. It may spend its money for the suppression of the boll weevil, but may
not compensate the farmers for suspending the growth of cotton in the infected areas. It
may aid state reforestation and forest fire prevention agencies, 43 Stat. 653, but may not
be permitted to supervise their conduct. It may support rural schools, 39 Stat. 929, 45
Stat. 1151, 48 Stat. 792, but may not condition its grant by the requirement that certain
standards be maintained." 53
Whether the proposition upon which the majority decision is rested is "absurd"
or not is obviously a question of the degree, to which it is to be extended. It is not
difficult to state extreme hypothetical cases which will make any proposition seem
absurd. What we are dealing with, however, is but another example of the great
question at what point the purely logical extension of federal power must be limited
by its infringement upon the fundamental proposition that our government is one
of dual sovereignty. Ultimately, this point must be determined on the basis of the
common sense, or of the social and political theories-or perhaps of the state of the
digestion-of the Justices. In determining this point with respect to the commerce
power, the taxing power, or any of the other federal powers, the same considerations
come into play. In holding that most of the New Deal laws which have thus far
come before the Court exceeded any admissible extension of federal power, it seems
fairly clear that the Court was strongly influenced by the very magnitude and scope
of the extension of federal power sought to be made by legislation enacted since 1932.
In the light of what has been said, it is difficult to see how Titles II and VIII of
the Social Security Act can stand as an exercise of the welfare power. That they
must be read together is clear; and, read together, it is equally clear that they go far
beyond an appropriation. They set up an elaborate system for compulsory saving.
They regulate the relations between employers and employees in local industries, in
mining, in clerical employments. They establish conditions of employment. None
of these things can be reached directly by federal action; all are matters of state
concern.
Title IX does not even purport to be an appropriation, and can therefore claim
no support from the welfare clause.
Title I (and the similar Titles III, IV, V and X, making grants to the states for
the administration of state unemployment compensation plans, for aid to dependent
children, for maternal and child welfare and for aid to the blind) presents a more
difficult question. Undoubtedly the objects of all these grants are well within the
'Id. at 328.
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"public welfare" clause and undoubtedly mere appropriations for such purposes
would be valid.
The only question is whether the restrictions placed upon the grants in Title I
(and the other similar titles) partake sufficiently either of a regulation of state
affairs or of an attempt to coerce the states into action, to be an invalid exercise of
federal power. Thus, the requirement of Title I, that, in order to justify federal
grants, a state plan of old-age assistance must provide for financial participation by
the state; that the administration of the state law must be satisfactory, so as to insure
minimum costs of administration; that, of the amounts collected from th6 estates of
deceased beneficiaries, one-half must be remitted to the United States, are reasonable
conditions of a grant of federal aid. This is not quite so clear, however, of the re-
quirement that the state law must be compulsory in all the political subdivisions of
the state. In many, there is at present scope for local option. Why must this be
given up? Nor is it quite so clear of the residence requirement imposed by Title I.
Whether any of the foregoing requirements are reasonable conditions, or whether
they go beyond that, and are an attempt to control state policy on matters of state
concern, is the question which must determine the validity of Title I. The question
is obviously one of emphasis, of degree. The considerations influencing the decision
are similar to those which determine whether th& regulations contained in what
purports to be a taxing act are, in fact, regulations reasonably related to the collec-
tion of the tax, br whether they go beyond that and contemplate the regulation of a
matter over which Congress has no jurisdiction.54
That the provisions of these titles will result in tremendous pressure upon state
legislatures to adopt old-age assistance and other welfare legislation or to modify
existing laws, if necessary, cannot be doubted. Local taxes are too hard to raise to
permit legislatures to resist the temptation to obtain donations from the central gov-
ernment. Most states will receive more than their citizens will pay in federal taxes
and that will be a sufficient argument; and the pressure will be equally heavy upon
the few states which will receive less-for to comply with the federal wish and receive
something is cheaper than to remain aloof and yet contribute to other states. That
the power to exercise such pressure upon the states in matters in which the federal
government can admittedly not directly compel action is inimical to the dual system
of government embedded in the Constitution seems clear. Its exercise, even with the
best of motives, is on the borderline of constitutionality. On the whole, Title I and
the other similar titles, are'probably valid. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say
that Title I is, strictly, unconstitutional; but that it is within the tolerance permitted.
Whether the constitutionality of these tides will ever be tested is another question.
Thus far, it has not been possible to bring a similar question before the Court. In a
case in which the State of Massachusetts and an individual taxpayer sought to re-
strain the carrying out of the Maternity Act,55 a law very similar in intention and in
detail to Title I of the Social Security Act, upon the ground that it was unconstitu-
5 4See Linder v. U. S., 268 U. S. 5 (1925). 42 STAT. 224 (1921).
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tional, the Court expressly declined to pass on the constitutional question involved,
holding that the Court was without jurisdiction to entertain a suit raising this
question, whether it be brouglht by a state or by an individual taxpayer. With respect
to the suit brought by the state, the Court held that
"Probably it would be sufficient to point out that the powers of the State are not in-
vaded, since the statute imposes no obligation, but simply extends an option which the
State is free to accept or reject....
"... If Congress enacted [the statute] with the ulterior purpose of tempting [thf-
States] to yield, that purpose may be effectually frustrated by the simple expedient of not
yielding."56
In view of this, the Court held that there was no "controversy" over which the Court
could take jurisdiction.
As to the suit brought by the individual taxpayer, the Court also held that it
could not entertain jurisdiction, on the ground that the interest of the individual
taxpayer
"is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the
effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and
uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of
equity."57
In addition, the Court stated that the matter was of "public, and not individual, con-
cern" and that suit by individual taxpayers would result in great inconvenience.
The foregoing case was decided by a unanimous Court; and it may be assumed
that the Court will come to the same conclusion with respect to any appropriation
which, on the one.hand, clearly falls within the welfare clause, and which, on the
other hand, does not clearly seek indirectly to regulate matters of local concern. On
principle, however, the decision of the Court in that case, to the effect that an indi-
vidual taxpayer has no standing to enjoin an appropriation of Congress, is of
extremely doubtful soundness; .and, especially after the decision of the Court in the
4. A. A. case, in which the Court held that Congress cannot exert economic pressure
upon an individual to induce him to act as it desires him to act, the Court may not
follow its previous decision if there should be presented for consideration a situation
in which the appropriating act clearly goes beyond an appropriation upon reasonable
conditions, and seeks to coerce or to "purchase" compliance by the states with federal
wishes.
To summarize: all of the provisions of the Social Security Act with respect to
unemployment insurance and to compulsory federal old-age pensions are void, since
they are not an exercise of any federal power and are an invasion of matters reserved
to the states; the grants-in-aid are probably constitutional, but their validity will even
more probably never be tested.
"Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 480, 482 (1923).
"Frothingham v. Mellon, id. at 487.
